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Another "trust" mechanism to consider would be to publish RDF statements in=
 an identified dataset, without having to get into heavyweight mechanisms t=
hat bind trust to individual statements or subgraph documents.

I'm splitting hairs on the word "provenance", but it seems worth mentioning=
.

Jeff

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bibliographic Framework Transition Initiative Forum
> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of [log in to unmask]
> Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 2:33 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [BIBFRAME] Bibframe and Linked Data (Authorities)
>=20
> It is useful and convenient, and it won't serve all purposes-- it's
> good to have, it's just not enough.
>=20
> That second principle stands entire in a world in which provenance
> information is separate from DNS. Let's say you publish an HTTP URI
> identifying an author interesting to me, and I make some assertions
> using your URI. Then someone consuming my data can "travel through"
> that URI to find out _something_ more about that author, which is to
> say, to discover more assertions involving that author (presumably with
> a subject of that author). So far so good, and that's as far as the
> second principle takes us. Provenance becomes interesting when my
> hypothetical patron asks, "Wait, how much can I trust this information
> about my author? Of what value are these assertions published by Jeff
> Young to _me_?"
>=20
> Now, we're no longer in the realm of questions that can be answered by
> the DNS.
>=20
> I wouldn't propose that we somehow "outlaw" letting assumptions about
> provenance rely on DNS, and we couldn't if I was odd enough to demand
> it. I do propose that we frequently need more than that, and that we
> should be thinking about how to do it. That doesn't seem too
> controversial to me. {grin}
>=20
> ---
> A. Soroka
> The University of Virginia Library
>=20
> On Jul 10, 2014, at 2:21 PM, "Young,Jeff (OR)" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>=20
> > It depends on how strictly you interpret "provenance" and the
> need/willingness to carry it's burden. If people are overly concerned
> about DNS, then what's the point of TimBL's 2nd principle of Linked
> Data?
> >
> > 2. Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up those names.
> >
> > This isn't a heavy-weight form of provenance and won't serve all
> purposes, but it's useful and convenient.
> >
> > Jeff
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Bibliographic Framework Transition Initiative Forum
> >> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of [log in to unmask]
> >> Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 2:04 PM
> >> To: [log in to unmask]
> >> Subject: Re: [BIBFRAME] Bibframe and Linked Data (Authorities)
> >>
> >> No, it does not!
> >>
> >> We need to distinguish carefully between the URI, which is a pure
> >> identifier, and the URI-that-happens-to-be-an-URL, which is also a
> >> pointer or link. Much of the power of linked data comes precisely
> >> from combining those roles, but that needs to be a conscious
> decision
> >> and not a matter of faith. {grin}
> >>
> >> Let's say that a very small institution publishes a number of URIs
> >> like "http://www.littlelibrary.org/authorities/4535". Then Little
> >> Library disappears as an organization, and its domain is purchased
> by
> >> someone else. It becomes instantly possible for that someone else to
> >> publish anything at all into that namespace and, if we base
> >> provenance on the DNS, we have no way to distinguish these groups of
> >> identifiers. You might say that VIAF is unlikely to disappear
> >> tomorrow, and that's true, but the point is that relying on domain
> >> name registrars to manage the provenance information of our metadata
> >> would be an accident waiting to happen.
> >>
> >> ---
> >> A. Soroka
> >> The University of Virginia Library
> >>
> >> On Jul 10, 2014, at 1:40 PM, "Smith-Yoshimura,Karen"
> >> <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Kevin -
> >>>
> >>> Re:
> >>>> There's been lots of talk about provenance and the like in a
> global
> >> graph of data, but I feel most of those discussions rely on fairly
> >> technical mechanisms, the complexity of >which outweigh the
> >> simplicity of minting one's own URI.  (Also, the provenance
> >> statements will need their own URIs!)
> >>>
> >>> Doesn't  http://viaf.org/viaf/54202464 show the provenance is VIAF?
> >> What's complex about this?
> >>>
> >>> Karen S-Y
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>