On Jul 16, 2014 12:24 PM, "Karen Coyle" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> And in the thread that begins on 7/10/14 with a post by Karen Smith-Yoshimura, I believe that we demonstrate that using as subject a URI from a third part does NOT imply that the statement was made by that party. This is one of the fundamental "truths" of the semantic web - that anyone can say anything about anything (AAA), and the URI does NOT indicate provenance of the statement (triple).

Just to clarify the last part of that paragraph (which is generally correct that without any other information, the IRIs in a graph could come from a source with no connection to any IRI in the graph).

1. If the document from which an assertion (s, p, o) was derived was obtained by using the IRI s as a URL, then that action provides a part of the  provenance chain. This kind of provenance information is only knowable to the party that fetched the resource.

The reason why this is worth calling out is that it is common if you  "follow your nose" to find assertions about some object, and because if TLS is used to retrieve the source, the identity of the person asserting the triples is known.

The IRI could be used to form the name in a named graph; so could the final URL used, if multiple redirection happened.

2. If an assertion is made in a form that associates the triple with a named graph name (e.g. N-Quads or Trig), the final IRI g in the quad (s, p, o, g) may serve as the subject of provenance assertions and non-repudiable digital signatures.

> On 7/16/14, 8:41 AM, Thomas Berger wrote:
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