Simon, I think this gets clarified in the cataloging rules, since the reality of Person is complex and contains some necessary ambiguities. The reason why I would punt this to the rules is for practical purposes: the cataloger is not omniscient, and generally does not have knowledge of the actual human being, only a name on a title page and, at best, some publisher blah blah about the author/creator. The rules already cover the difference (when known) between a pseudonym as author and "real person" as subject. The rules also state that a pseudonymous persona has the same ontological status (the same "reality") as a person using their "real name." All of these seem to me to be sensible solutions to the complex problem of "who/what is a person"? We just need to be diligent about sharing our definitions with other communities so they understand what we are talking about. kc On 10/24/14 7:27 AM, Simon Spero wrote: > > There is some punning involved with Persons in the bibliographic > universe that requires careful thought about the different individuals > of different types involved. > > Matters are not helped by the fact that a lot of the time the > different things may have the same marc authority record. > > 1. There are actual people (eg. human beings*). These are capable of > doing things, like creating works, being Dons, or arguing on mailing > lists. > > An example is [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson] , the man. The name** of this > entity is "Charles Lewis Dodgson". The name of a person can change > over time. > > 2. There are literary identities. These are abstract things that bear > names, and to which responsibility for a work may be assigned. An > identity may be associated with one or more people. > > The name of a literary identity may usually be the same as the name of > the person for whom it is an identity. > The name of a literary identity need not change when the name of the > person changes. > > Examples are : [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]' and [Lewis Carroll], which > bear the names "Charles Lutwidge Dodgson" and "Lewis Carroll" > respectively. Both identities were used by the man [Charles Lutwidge > Dodgson] > > These are the kind of things that are referred to in 100 fields. > > 3. There are entities which other things can be about. Let us call > these subjects. Some of these things can be about entities which are > people; others can be about entities which are Literary Identities. > > Subjects are intentional (with a t). They are ideas about things. The > possible relationships between subjects are not the same as those > between the things they are about. > > For example, topically subdivided headings can be about completely > different kinds of things to the undivided heading - a person's homes > and haunts are not themselves people, yet an implicit BT relationship > exists. > > A biography of [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson] (the man) would be about the > subject [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]''. > > A bibliography of the Works of [Lewis Carroll], the literary > identity, would be about the subject [Lewis Carroll]'. It might also > be considered to be about the subject [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]''. > > The names of these subjects would be "Charles Lutwidge Dodgson" and > "Lewis Carroll". > > 4. There are names, which are strings or things from which strings can > be generated. There can be several names associated with the types of > things identified above - names in direct order, inverted order, with > dates, etc. > > 5. There are authorized names, which are names which some agency has > specified as being permitted for use in some dataset. An agency can > only specify one such name for each entity. > > 6.There are name authority records, which are collections of > statements uttered by some agency relating a preferred name to other > names (along with other statements). > > Simon > > * homocentric assumption made w.I.o.g for sake of simplicity. > ** names given in uncontrolled, direct order for sake of simplicity > > Simon > > On Oct 24, 2014 8:55 AM, "Meehan, Thomas" <[log in to unmask] > <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote: > > > > I like the increased clarity that Person etc represents the person > rather than the authority concept but wonder now whether the class > Authority has some ambiguity: > > > > > > > > - the name/label Authority still suggests something like an > authority record for an entity rather than an entity as such. > > > > - the definition of an Authority says “Representation of a > key concept or thing”, which to me doesn’t suggest the concept or > thing itself. Shouldn’t it be just “A key concept or thing”. Or > perhaps just “A concept or thing”. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > > > Tom > > > > > > > > --- > > > > > > > > Thomas Meehan > > > > Head of Current Cataloguing > > > > Library Services > > > > University College London > > > > Gower Street > > > > London WC1E 6BT > > > > > > > > [log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]> > > > > > > > > From: Bibliographic Framework Transition Initiative Forum > [mailto:[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>] > On Behalf Of Robert Sanderson > > Sent: 24 October 2014 13:06 > > To: [log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]> > > Subject: [BIBFRAME] [Topic] Authority Subclasses > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Ray, Kevin, > > > > > > > > The revised description is better, but still ambiguous as to whether > the bf:Person *is* the person or is a record that *describes* the person. > > > > > > > > The definition implies that it is the person, the text below implies > that it's the record about the person. It would be great to be > explicit about this. > > > > > > > > Thanks! > > > > > > > > Rob > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Rob Sanderson > > > > Technology Collaboration Facilitator > > > > Digital Library Systems and Services > > > > Stanford, CA 94305 > -- Karen Coyle [log in to unmask] http://kcoyle.net m: +1-510-435-8234 skype: kcoylenet/+1-510-984-3600