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Simon, I think this gets clarified in the cataloging rules, since the 
reality of Person is complex and contains some necessary ambiguities. 
The reason why I would punt this to the rules is for practical purposes: 
the cataloger is not omniscient, and generally does not have knowledge 
of the actual human being, only a name on a title page and, at best, 
some publisher blah blah about the author/creator. The rules already 
cover the difference (when known) between a pseudonym as author and 
"real person" as subject.

The rules also state that a pseudonymous persona has the same 
ontological status (the same "reality") as a person using their "real 
name."

All of these seem to me to be sensible solutions to the complex problem 
of "who/what is a person"? We just need to be diligent about sharing our 
definitions with other communities so they understand what we are 
talking about.

kc

On 10/24/14 7:27 AM, Simon Spero wrote:
>
> There is some punning involved with Persons in the bibliographic 
> universe that requires careful thought about the different individuals 
> of different types involved.
>
> Matters are not helped by the fact that a lot of the time the 
> different things may have the same marc authority record.
>
> 1. There are actual people (eg. human beings*). These are capable of 
> doing things, like creating works, being Dons, or arguing on mailing 
> lists.
>
> An example is [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson] , the man. The name** of this 
> entity is "Charles Lewis Dodgson".  The name of a person can change 
> over time.
>
> 2. There are literary identities. These are abstract things that bear 
> names, and to which responsibility for a work may be assigned. An 
> identity may be associated with one or more people.
>
> The name of a literary identity may usually be the same as the name of 
> the person for whom it is an identity.
> The name of a literary identity need not change when the name of the 
> person changes.
>
> Examples are : [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]' and [Lewis Carroll], which 
> bear the names "Charles Lutwidge Dodgson" and "Lewis Carroll" 
> respectively. Both identities were used by the man [Charles Lutwidge 
> Dodgson]
>
> These are the kind of things that are referred to in 100 fields.
>
> 3. There are entities which other things can be about. Let us call 
> these subjects. Some of these things can be about entities which are 
> people; others can be about entities which are Literary Identities.
>
> Subjects are intentional (with a t). They are ideas about things. The 
> possible relationships between subjects are not the same as those 
> between the things they are about.
>
> For example, topically subdivided headings can be about completely 
> different kinds of things to the undivided heading - a person's homes 
> and haunts are not themselves people, yet an implicit BT relationship 
> exists.
>
> A biography of [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson] (the man) would be about the 
> subject [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]''.
>
> A bibliography of the Works of [Lewis Carroll],  the literary 
> identity, would be about the subject [Lewis Carroll]'. It might also 
> be considered to be about the subject [Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]''.
>
> The names of these subjects would be "Charles Lutwidge Dodgson" and 
> "Lewis Carroll".
>
> 4. There are names, which are strings or things from which strings can 
> be generated. There can be several names associated with the types of 
> things identified above - names in direct order, inverted order, with 
> dates, etc.
>
> 5. There are authorized names, which are names which some agency has 
> specified as being permitted for use in some dataset. An agency can 
> only specify one such name for each entity.
>
> 6.There are name authority records, which are collections of 
> statements uttered by some agency relating a preferred name to other 
> names (along with other statements).
>
> Simon
>
> * homocentric assumption made w.I.o.g for sake of simplicity.
> ** names given in uncontrolled, direct order for sake of simplicity
>
> Simon
>
> On Oct 24, 2014 8:55 AM, "Meehan, Thomas" <[log in to unmask] 
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
> >
> > I like the increased clarity that Person etc represents the person 
> rather than the authority concept but wonder now whether the class 
> Authority has some ambiguity:
> >
> >
> >
> > -          the name/label Authority still suggests something like an 
> authority record for an entity rather than an entity as such.
> >
> > -          the definition of an Authority says “Representation of a 
> key concept or thing”, which to me doesn’t suggest the concept or 
> thing itself. Shouldn’t it be just “A key concept or thing”. Or 
> perhaps just “A concept or thing”.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> >
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
> >
> > ---
> >
> >
> >
> > Thomas Meehan
> >
> > Head of Current Cataloguing
> >
> > Library Services
> >
> > University College London
> >
> > Gower Street
> >
> > London WC1E 6BT
> >
> >
> >
> > [log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Bibliographic Framework Transition Initiative Forum 
> [mailto:[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>] 
> On Behalf Of Robert Sanderson
> > Sent: 24 October 2014 13:06
> > To: [log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> > Subject: [BIBFRAME] [Topic] Authority Subclasses
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi Ray, Kevin,
> >
> >
> >
> > The revised description is better, but still ambiguous as to whether 
> the bf:Person *is* the person or is a record that *describes* the person.
> >
> >
> >
> > The definition implies that it is the person, the text below implies 
> that it's the record about the person.  It would be great to be 
> explicit about this.
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> >
> >
> > Rob
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Rob Sanderson
> >
> > Technology Collaboration Facilitator
> >
> > Digital Library Systems and Services
> >
> > Stanford, CA 94305
>

-- 
Karen Coyle
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