Indeed I was looking for an alternative term for "Agent", not for "Res".

Admittedly, "Identity" has many meanings and is used in various 
contexts, as can be seen in Wikipedia:

But the meaning intended in the context of FRBR-LRM (if my suggestion 
was adopted) could be clarified by the definition.

Have you got a better idea?


On 28.03.2016 Thomas Berger wrote:
> Am 28.03.2016 um 11:01 schrieb Heidrun Wiesenmüller:
>>> I don’t have a suggestion for what to name the over-arching entity;
>>> perhaps someone else can make a suggestion—or maybe it’s not necessary
>>> to simplify the model to this extent. I do recommend that the two
>>> narrower entities be called “individual” and “collective” or “group”
>>> (rather than “collective agent”).
>> I wonder whether "identity" could be used as an alternative to "agent"?
>> Of course I'm not a native speakter, but I think that this would be
>> broad enough to cover real and fictitious entities as well as human and
>> non-human ones.
> I'm not sure whether there exist an universally accepted definition
> of "identity", but ad hoc I'd say that anything with a name has
> identity (right then I will be able to integrate it into a discourse
> relating it to any other thing in the universe). So the "overarching
> concept" would fall together with "res", or with a bit of caution
> into that subclass of "res" for which "nomens" are established in the
> universe.
> It's fine with me that this also includes "level-1 entities", but I'm
> not sure if that has been intended by you.
> Stepping back a bit: The "agents" of FRBR-LRM are probably just a
> convencience translation of the "actors" in the lingo of the museum
> folks, i.e. anything that can "act" (lat. agere) should fall within
> that scope. I think we already settled on the fact that the ability
> to act is sufficient for membership in that class, not actual
> action. So since there are persons and corporate bodies which act,
> the classes should be considered subclasses of (let's temporarily
> stick with the name) agents.
> Some interesting corner cases here are
> * archeological specimens (Lucy, Pildown Man, Oetzi, ...) I remember
>    the German Personennormdatei for many years did not admit them,
>    they had to be stowed away as subject headings in the Schlagwort
>    normdatei. I don't remember the exact line of argument then, but
>    IMHO it had something to do with their non-relevance as persons
>    when alive (relevance to us, of course, not to their folks)
> * personae. In some areas of current pop music to my knowledge
>    almost everybody is expressing himself in form of "musical
>    projects" (formerly known as side-projects)
>    cf. for that kind
>    of descriptive prose where anyone with "bibliographic"
>    mindset is just going to perish. The most concise characterization
>    seems to be "production orientated studio entity" but applies
>    only to the timespan before it became "a viable [...] band".
> [ LRM-E1 names "entities not specifically labelled" and I think
>    this would allow personae. However LRM-E6 states
> "The entity agent is a superclass strictly equivalent to the union
> of the entities person and collective agent"
>    and I deem this highly problematic, because "agents" on one
>    hand and "persons" and "collective bodies" on the other hand
>    all have definitions of their own. So the qote above is
>    a theorem which should be proven based on the definitions,
>    or it can be considered an axiom, which heavily determines
>    the shape and extend of the bibliographic universe.
> ]
> * Journals (especially newspapers) as collective bodies:
>    Section 5.6 of the FRBR-LRM report discusses the "commonality
>    of content" (I understand "the editorial characteristics")
>    expressing the intentions of the publisher and the editor.
>    Are these really persons in case of huge publications with
>    a correspondingly huge editorial staff or is rather "the
>    journal" also an organization committed to producing "the
>    journal"? I remember that when cataloguing correspondence
>    between authors and the journals they were publishing in
>    you usually cannot find the corporate body you need to
>    record - it's just "the journal". The Same happens when you
>    describe the archives of a journal.
> * Events as collective agents. This is not thematized in the
>    current report (I think) but in the original FRBR I perceived
>    it as a somehow very unclean trick: Events as (usually for
>    the formal description irrelevant) level 3 entities were
>    elevated to (considered as) corporate bodies, i.e. level 2
>    entities. In the context of FRBR-LRM there is no such
>    provision, we have to investigate if (and how) events
>    can be agents.
>    I /can/ see, say, the 62nd /Session/ of the UN General Assembly
>    (taking place from September 2007 to September 2008 in a
>    sequence of /meetings/), or the 114th United States Congress
>    (Jan. 2015 - Jan. 2017) as (temporally constrained) collective
>    bodies, but have a hard time imagining them as events.
>    On the other hand I personally have never been able to
>    mentally integrate the event-ness of an art exhibition
>    with the concept of a corporate body (especially in
>    consideration of the auxiliary means of some group of
>    people expressing their collective thought), rather the
>    bibliographic importance of an art exhibition lies in
>    a) the works on display and b) the curating work of the
>    staff and is usually almost completed (including publication
>    of the catalogue) when the "event" opens its gates (of course
>    the local TV station will report on the event as such, or
>    rather the vernissage as a individual sub-event, one will still
>    need some modelling to glue these together).
>    As a consequence either the exhibition as work has a work-work
>    relation (derived work) to the catalogue or accompanying
>    pamphlet, or (analguous to the journal case above) the
>    exhibition as a work has also aspects of a collective body
>    and as such is authoring or editing the publications.
>    I do not see any way in the context of FRBR-LRM to continue
>    the practice of handling general events as corporate bodies:
>    The event has a name, but the participants at events (like
>    a cinema show) are "acting as a unit" only in the very narrow
>    scope that participating in the event itself is acting as
>    participant of the event - but where is the unit here?
> FRBR-LRM does not make many statements as to mutual exclusivity.
> I could identify:
> * The W-E-M-I entities are mutually disjoint (mentioned in
>    LRM-E2,3,4,5)
> * "agent" is the disjoint union of "person" and "collective
>    agent" (I challenged that already)
> Specifically there is no prescription that the W-E-M-I
> entities are somehow disjoint from or of a different nature
> than all other entities in the universe.
> So, at least formally, events (only used as examples, not
> formally described), time-spans and places could be
> simultaneously W-E-M-I entities, and if not for the very
> narrow, "biologistic" definitions of persons and collective
> bodies, they could be W-E-M-I entities too: If we would
> open the gates for fictitious entities as agents (e.g. personae)
> and/or fictitious characters as persons (the biography of
> Sherlock Holmes probably is more complete than that of most
> real persons), then we'd have to deal with the creating
> circumstances of these fictions and on the level of the
> model will have to settle whether the inception of that
> fiction (a work) and the fictitious entity (a person or
> agent) should be considered one or two entities.
> with heretic greetings
> Thomas Berger
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Prof. Heidrun Wiesenmueller M.A.
Stuttgart Media University
Nobelstrasse 10, 70569 Stuttgart, Germany